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CASE NOTES
only when a party is involved in a sales transaction and does not
call for the application of the objective standard in a dispute between
two merchants not parties to a sales transaction between themselves.
LEONARD S. VoLIN
Labor Law—Authority of National Labor Relations Board—Con-
solidation of Existing Bargaining Units through Unit Clarification
Proceedings—United Glass & Ceramic Workers v. NLRB.'---The
United Glass and Ceramic Workers and various locals thereof (Union)
brought suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit to challenge a decision by the National Labor Relations Board'
which dismissed an unfair labor practice complaint filed against
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. The Company maintained ten plants at various
locations throughout the country, eight of which composed a single
multiplant unit; in this unit the Union was certified as the exclusive
bargaining representative. Each of the two remaining units was orga-
nized as a separate bargaining unit by the Union, and the Union en-
joyed voluntary recognition in the two single-plant units. 3 In 1968,
after the Company had refused during collective bargaining with the
multiplant unit to consent to Union requests for consolidation of all
three units, the Union petitioned the Board for a unit clarification to
merge the three units into a single multiplant unit. The full Board de-
cided, with Members Fanning and Jenkins dissenting, that the unit
clarification proceeding may be used to consolidate existing bargaining
units, and ordered a self-determination election in each single-plant unit
to ascertain the wishes of the employees.' In the elections, a majority
in each plant preferred consolidation with the multiplant unit, and the
NLRB, subsequent to the elections, ordered the consolidation of the
three units.' The Company acceded to the merger of one of the single-
plant units with the multiplant unit, but, for a number of reasons,"
1
 463 F.2d 31, 80 L.R.R.M. 2882 (3d Cir. 1972).
2
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806 (1971).
9
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. McCulloch, 67 L.R.R.M 2712, 2714 (D.D.C.
1968). In this case the district court enjoined the Board from conducting the self-
determination election hereinafter discussed. On appeal the injunction was dissolved. The
dissolution was based upon a lack of jurisdiction in the district court to enter the in-
junction. McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916, 68 L.R.R.M. 2447
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
4
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1968). The
use of the unit clarification for this purpose was a marked departure from traditional
Board usages. See text at notes 13-22 infra.
The official report of the Board indicates a majority consisting of Chairman McCul-
loch and Members Fanning and Zagoria, with Members Fanning and Jenkins concurring
in part and dissenting In part. It seems apparent that Member Brown, not Member Fan-
ning, was a member of the majority, and that there was a misprint in the official re-
port.
5
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1231, 69 L.R.R.M. 1558 (1968).
Brief for Intervenor at 31-33, United Glass & Ceramic Workers v. NLRB, 463
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refused to bargain with the second single-plant unit as part of the merged
unit. Consequently, the Union brought an unfair labor practice charge
under Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 7
and the General Counsel issued a complaint thereon, which the NLRB
dismissed.8 While Members Fanning and Jenkins maintained their orig-
inal position that the Board did not have the statutory authority to
consolidate the three bargaining units in the unit clarification proceed-
ing, Member Kennedy, who had joined the Board since the initial deci-
sion, and Member Brown thought that the Board did have the requisite
authority; Chairman Miller agreed that the Board possessed sufficient
authority, but thought that the NLRB should voluntarily refrain from
imposing consolidation and leave that matter to collective bargaining;
in short, Chairman Miller believed that the Board's 1968 order to con-
solidate should not be the basis of an unfair labor practice?
The Union challenged the Board's dismissal of the unfair labor
practice complaint in the instant suit and presented the Third Circuit
squarely with the issue: whether the NLRB has the authority to use
the unit clarification proceeding to consolidate existing bargaining
units into a single multiplant unit. The court of appeals HELD: the
NLRB has the authority under the broad powers invested in it by
Section 9(b) of the NLRAi° to use a unit clarification proceeding to
consolidate existing bargaining units into a multiplant unit; it also has
the power to conduct a self-determination election in the units, but this
power is limited to situations in which the NLRB has found either
bargaining unit to be appropriate. Since only one member of the
current Board had expressed an opinion on the appropriateness of the
proposed merged unit," the court remanded to the Board for deter-
mination of that issue.'
The court's holding greatly increases the potential for use of the
unit clarification procedure by the NLRB. It will be emphasized below,
however, that at present it is uncertain whether the Board will exercise
the authority recognized in the Third Circuit's decision. This doubt is
due to the uncertain reaction of the Board members who haVe not ex-
pressed a view concerning use of the unit clarification to merge existing
F.2d 31, 80 L.R.R.M. 2882 (3d Cir. 1972). In sum, the Company maintained that the
plant was a "separate business." Brief at 33.
7
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970):
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(5) to refuse to bar-
gain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the pro-
visions of section 159(a) of this title.
8 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806 (1971).
0 Id. at —, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1807.
10 29 U.S.C.	 159(b) (1970).
11 Member Kennedy has found both units presumptively appropriate. See 169
N.L.R.B. at 126, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1096; 189 N.L.R.B. at —, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1808
(Member Kennedy dissenting). Chairman Miller and Members Fanning and Jenkins
have never reached the issue. Member Penello joined the Board after the final Libbey-
Owens-Ford decision.
12 463 F.2d at 38, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2886.
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units or who have steadfastly denied the existence of this power. If
these members adopt the position that the Board, in an exercise of its
discretion, should refrain from exercising this power, the effect of the
court's decision will be negligible.
This note will review the background of the unit clarification pro-
cedure and discuss the statutory basis for consolidation of bargaining
units. The court's decision will then be discussed in light of the policy
considerations attendant upon the merger of bargaining units, particu-
larly those regarding the use of the unit clarification for this purpose.
Finally, the effect of Glass Workers upon future NLRB consideration
of unit clarification petitions will be assessed.
To obtain a better understanding of the use of the unit clarification
petition in Glass Workers, it will be helpful to review the background
of the procedure and its use." Prior to 1964, a party desiring a unit
clarification or an amendment of certification" was required to move for
clarification or amendment during a representation proceeding under
Section 9(c) 15
 of the NLRA.1° In 1964, the NLRB promulgated the
Unit Clarification Rule." This rule delineates a procedure whereby, in
the absence of a 9 (c) question of representation," and even during the
term of an existing collective bargaining agreement," either party to
the collective bargaining relationship can petition for a unit clarification
pursuant to section 9(b). Despite the potentially broad scope of peti-
tions permissible under the rule, the unit clarification procedure evolved
only in two general areas: first, in cases of disputed job classifications;"
13
 For an extensive discussion of this background, see Abodeely, The NLRB and
the Unit Clarification Petition, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075 (1969).
14
 Technically, the amendment of certification is used in a situation in which a
union has been certified by the NLRB as the exclusive bargaining representative, and
the unit clarification is used when an employer has voluntarily recognized, and entered
into collective bargaining with, the union. In practice, however, these terms are used
interchangeably. Goslee, Clarification of Bargaining Units and Amendments to Certifica-
tions, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 988, 989 n.3.
18
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
10
 Goslee, supra note 14, at 990. Initially, a prerequisite for such a motion was the
previous certification of the union. Bell Tel. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 371, 40 L.R.R.M. 1179
(1957), overruled, Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521, 55
L.R.R.M. 1177 (1964). This is now explicitly covered by the Unit Clarification Rule,
discussed in text at notes 17-22 infra.
17
 29 C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1972): "A petition for clarification of an existing bar-
gaining unit or a petition for amendment of certification, in the absence of a question
concerning representation, may be filed by a labor organization or by an employer."
18
 The terms "question of representation" and "questions concerning representation"
are used interchangeably by the courts. They are § 9(c) phrases which must be distin-
guished from "representational dispute" and "representative question," which are more
general terms used in conjunction with Sections 9(a) and 9(b) of the Act. See, e.g.,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 64 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1967).
to Goslec, supra note 14, at 991.
20 This typically occurs when a union claims that it should represent those em-
ployees who perform a particular function and the employer assigns the job to a class
of employees that the union does not normally represent. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 64 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1967).
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and second, in cases of accretions to an existing bargaining unit. 21
In these areas, unit clarification is a convenient procedure providing the
Board with flexibility in adjusting the scope of bargaining units as con-
ditions change."
In unit clarification decisions, the Board traditionally has relied on
such factors as administrative coherence, geographic cohesiveness, em-
ployee interchange, and uniformity of terms of employment, wage sys-
tems, fringe benefits, and seniority rights in determining whether a
community of interest exists between groups of employees sought to be
included in a bargaining unit." Generally, the Board rejects petitions
for clarification in situations in which the community of interest is not
found," although the traditional factors have not always been applied
consistently." Bath Iron Works Corp.,26 decided prior to the first Lib-
bey
-Owens -Ford decision, illustrates the Board's reluctance to consoli-
date units when its traditional requirements have not been met; at the
same time, it presaged the use of the unit clarification procedure to con-
solidate existing bargaining units. The Bath Company and its wholly-
owned subsidiary, which were organized into separate bargaining units
by the same union, merged their operations. The union then petitioned
for a unit clarification to merge the two existing bargaining units, but
the Board denied the petition because of an absence of the traditionally
required community of interest between the two existing units. The
basis for this decision was that although Bath and its subsidiary had
merged, the workers in the two plants still maintained separate and
distinct functions.27 However, even though the Board found that a single
consolidated unit would be inappropriate, the Board's opinion implicitly
assumed the statutory authority to use the unit clarification proceed-
ing to consolidate existing bargaining units. In 1968, the NLRB used
the authority which it had implicitly claimed in Bath Iron Works when
it granted the clarification petition of the United Glass and Ceramic
Workers.
In Glass Workers, the court found a statutory basis for Board
use of the unit clarification proceeding to merge existing units in the
broad congressional mandate to the Board to determine appropriate
units under section 9 (b) 28 It will be submitted below that the court's
21 This situation occurs when an employer gains employees through expansion or
merger. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Refining Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1361, 59 L.R.R.M. 1632
(1965).
22
 Goslee, supra note 14, at 996-1004. The unit clarification has been used primarily
when there have been changes in the work force of a particular employer or industry
due to technological advances, employer reorganization, or economic growth. Id.
23 See, e.g., PPG Industries, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 477, 480, 73 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1004
(1969).
24 See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 316, 61 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1965).
25 Abodeely, supra note 13, at 1086.
26 154 N.L.R.B. 1069, 60 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1965).
27 Id. at 1070, 60 L.R.R.M. at 1083.
28
 463 F.2d at 35-37, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2884-85. Section 9(b) gives the Board wide
discretion to determine appropriate units. For example, in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
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result is correct. In reaching this result, the court gave little attention
to the contentions of Libbey-Owens-Ford that the Board lacked the
statutory authority to conduct an election in the absence of a question
of representation,26 and that the Board was without statutory authority
to consolidate bargaining units by use of a unit clarification." In
support of its argument that the Board lacked authority to conduct an
election in the absence of a question of representation, the Company
maintained that all unit determinations must be made in relation to
representation proceedings under section 9(c) al Supplementing this
point, the employer had argued, in the original Board case, that because
section 9 (b), which gives the Board authority to determine the appro-
priate bargaining unit, is specifically limited by section 9(c) (5),a 2 all
unit determinations are necessarily restricted to cases arising under
section 9 (c) .83
While the court did not accept this contention, its failure to
address it directly suggests that the court's reasoning was faulty. The
language of the court's opiniona4
 shows that it assumed that section
9(c) could not limit section 9(b) to cases in which there is a question
of representation under 9(c) because the "U [nit] C [larification] rule,
by its terms, is inapplicable where a question of representation, as
opposed to a representational dispute, is involved."' The court's rea-
soning seems to be circular. To establish that the Board's power to
make unit determinations under section 9 (b) is not restricted by section
9(c), the court relied upon the Unit Clarification Rule, which explicitly
states that it can be used only "in the absence of a question concerning
representation."" However, the Unit Clarification Rule was promul-
gated by the NLRB pursuant to its power under section 9 (b) ; 37 and
the Board rejects the argument that its 9(b) power to determine
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 134 (1944), the Supreme Court stated: "Wide variations in the forms
of employee self-organization and the complexities of modern industrial organization
make difficult the use of inflexible rules as a test of an appropriate unit. Congress .. .
gave the Board wide discretion in the matter,"
28
 Brief for Intervenor at 22-29, United Glass & Ceramic Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d
31, 80 L.R.R.M. 2882 (3d Cir. 1972).
80 Id. at 21.
81 Id. at 22-29.
82
 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (1970): "In determining whether a unit is appropriate for
the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section the extent to which the employees
have organized shall not be controlling."
88 Brief for Employer for Rehearing and Oral Argument, Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass
Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1968), as cited in Abodeely, supra note 13,
at 1095.
84
 "The mere absence of such a 9(c) representational issue in the instant case does
not deprive the Board of the authority to conduct the proceeding in view of the existence
of a representational issue under § 9(a) and (b)." 463 F.2d at 36-37 n.14, 80 L.R.R.M.
at 2885 n.14.
86 Id.
86 29 C.F.R. § 102.60(b) (1972).
87 29 C,F.R. § 102.60(b) is entitled "Petition for clarification of bargaining unit or
petition for amendment of certification under section 9(b) of the Act. .. ."
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appropriate units is limited by or subordinate to section 9(c). 88 Thus
the court seems to substantiate its conclusion merely by citing the same
conclusion as applied by the NLRB.
A better reason, it is submitted, for rejecting the argument that
the Board's power to determine the appropriate unit under section 9 (b)
is limited to cases in which there is a question of representation under
section 9(c), is that it is highly doubtful that Congress intended so to
restrict the application of section 9(b). First, since section 9(b) pre-
cedes section 9(c), it seems reasonable to assume that 9(b) was not
intended to be used exclusively in conjunction with 9(c).89 Second, the
authority given to the NLRB by section 9(b) contains several express
limitations," but none of these restrict the Board from adjusting unit
determinations as conditions in the bargaining unit change, in the ab-
sence of a question of representation. In fact, Section 10(d) of the
NLRA gives the Board the authority to "modify .. • any finding or
order made or issued by it."" Third, in regard to the contention that
the Board's power under section 9(b) is limited to questions of repre-
sentation because it is expressly limited by section 9(c) (5), it seems
more reasonable to argue the converse: since 9(c) (5) expressly limits
section 9(b), Congress would also have expressly stated any other in-
tended limitations.' Furthermore, section 9(c) (5) was not included
in the original Act in 1935, but was added to the Act in the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Amendments." The sole purpose of 9(c) (5) is to prevent use
of the extent of organization as the controlling factor in determining
the appropriate bargaining unit." Thus section 9(c) (5) was not in-
tended to transform the remainder of 9(c) into a limitation of 9 (b)."
These three reasons demonstrate that a statutory foundation for Board
88
 See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521, 1523 n.5,
55 L.R.R.M. 1177, 1177-78 n.5 (1964).
89
 But cf. 2 J. Sutherland, Statutes & Statutory Construction I 4812 (3d ed. 1943).
40 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1)-(3). Subsection 9(b)(3) prevents inclusion of guards in a
unit which also includes other employees. Subsections 9(b)(1) and (2) involve situations
in which the Board must conduct an election to ascertain the employee's views concern-
ing the appropriateness of the unit; these subsections do not purport to delineate all
circumstances when the Board may ascertain employee preference, in fact they demon-
strate that elections may be used to determine questions other than those posed under
9(c). Cf. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 128, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096, 1099
(1968).
41
 29 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1970).
42 The "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" rule of statutory construction provides
that mention of one excludes all others. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. United
States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942).
43
 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 144 (1947).
44 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 820, 822-25, 55 L.R.R.M.
2448, 2449-52 (3d Cir. 1964).
45
 "Section 9(b) is not made subordinate to Section 9(c), and no limitation exists
on the Board's Section 9(b) power to define unit composition other than in Section
9(c)(5) where it is stated that the extent of employee organization may not be con-
trolling in such a determination." Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B.
1521, 1523 n.5, 55 L.R.R.M. 1177, 1177-78 n.5 (1964).
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merger of units over employer opposition does exist within the broad
authorization of section 9(b).
Despite the power under section 9(b) which seems to authorize
Board merger of units, it could be argued that the absence of prece-
dent" militates against recognition of Board authority to compel
merger. The dissenters in the original Libbey-Owens-Ford decision
maintained that there was a statutory void which did not permit the
Board to use the unit clarification proceeding, absent a 9(c) question
of representation, to conduct a self-determination election to obtain the
preference of the employees regarding the merger, and, should the
election so dictate, to consolidate the existing units. 47 However, this
argument is clearly fallacious since the Board can innovate within the
limits of its statutory authority through its power to legislate by
adjudication." This process enables the Board to formulate new rules
and policies informally through its decisions, without undergoing the
formalities of promulgating an official rule. For example, the Board has
exercised its administrative power to legislate by adjudication in the
unit clarification area itself. Prior to the enactment of the Unit Clarifi-
cation Rule, the Board overruled precedent and extended its power to
alter its original unit determination, by unit clarification, to cases in
which the union had been voluntarily recognized by the employer." It is
obvious that the Board is not rigidly constrained, and, where it has
statutory authority to do so, may innovate and legislate by adjudication
when it deems innovation desirable. It is submitted that in light of its
broad 9(b) power to determine appropriate units, the Board in its 1968
Libbey-Owens-Ford decision justifiably legislated by adjudication when
it extended the use of the unit clarification to include the merger of
existing bargaining units and to conduct a self-determination election.
The Glass Workers court, in effect, accepted the power of the
Board to legislate by adjudication; however, it would appear that it
reached this position by a semantically confused reasoning process.
It further appears that the court's approach was due, at least in part,
to its confusion of the term "question of representation" with a "repre-
sentational dispute," and its inability to extricate itself from the
semantic puzzle which it created. The court stated that in Carey v.
Westinghouse,")
 the Supreme Court had sanctioned the use of the unit
clarification procedure. The court reasoned that Carey had involved a
representational dispute, i.e., a dispute involving the 8(a) (5) duty of
48
 For an argument that precedent does in fact exist see text at notes 69-78 infra.
47
 169 N.L.R.B. at 129-30, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1099-1100 (opinion of Members Fanning
and Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48
 For discussion of the power of the NLRB to legislate by adjudication, see, e.g.,
NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 350-52 (1952); NLRB v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 270 F.2d 167, 174, 44 L.R.R.M. 2855, 2860 (4th Cir. 1959); see also 2
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.03 (1958).
49 Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521, 55 L.R.R.M. 1177
(1964), overruling Bell Tel. Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 371, 40 L.R.R.M. 1179 (1957).
50
 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
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the employer to bargain collectively with the representative of the
employees; in contrast, the Glass Workers case was viewed as a repre-
sentational dispute in the "broader sense that it involves a question of
representation for purposes of collective bargaining in an appropriate
unit. 7"1 Thus the court in a single sentence seemed to equate the terms
"representational dispute" and "question of representation." However,
it is submitted that the equation of these two terms is unfortunate,
since the whole thrust of the court's decision is that there does not
have to be a "question of representation" under section 9(c) in order
to grant a unit clarification petition to merge existing units and to
conduct self-determination elections.'" It is further submitted that the
crux of the court's analysis is stated in footnote form. Footnote thirteen
states: "It follows that a question involving unit scope is a representa-
tional one since a refusal to bargain with a unit found to be appropriate
could serve as the basis for an 8(a) (5) violation."" Similarly, footnote
fourteen states:
A dispute may be representational in the § 9(c) sense and
not rise to the level of a question of representation. The
mere absence of such a 9(c) representational issue in the
instant case does not deprive the Board of the authority to
conduct the proceeding in view of the existence of a repre-
sentational issue under § 9(a) and (b)."
When the court wanted to refer to the term "representational dispute,"
it used the term "representational question." It thus appears that in its
rationale the court was not attempting to equate "question of repre-
sentation" under 9(c) and "representational dispute" under 9 (b).
However, the court unfortunately became bogged down in semantics.
Once the opinion is stripped of its unfortunate verbiage, it becomes
clear that the court authorized the Board to merge the three existing
units through a unit clarification proceeding pursuant to its 9 (b) power.
That is, the court authorized an example of Board legislation through
adjudication under section 9(b).
Assuming the validity of the finding of statutory authority in
Glass Workers regardless of the method by which the court reached
its decision, the next question is whether the consolidation of existing
bargaining units over employer opposition should ever be allowed as a
matter of policy under the NLRA. Employer opposition has historically
been the principal obstacle to widespread union organization and col-
lective bargaining.'" One of the principal purposes of the NLRA is to
61 463 F.2d at 36, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2885.
52 Id. at 36-37 n.14, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2885 n.14. The language in the court's footnote
14 that reveals the essence of the court's opinion is quoted in text at note 54 infra.
55 Id. at 36 n.13, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2885 n.13 (emphasis added). The L.R.R.M. report
substitutes the word "representative" for the word "representational" found in this
quotation from the Federal Reporter, Second Series.
54 Id. at 37 n.14, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2885 n.14.
55 See generally R. Brooks, When Labor Organizes 64-98 (Reprint Ed. 1971).
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enable employees to overcome this obstacle by requiring recognition
and good faith bargaining by the employer upon a showing by a union
that a majority of the employees desire the union as their exclusive
bargaining representative." Hence, an employer cannot prevent the
organization of his employees by refusal to assent thereto. In light of
this, it seems entirely reasonable for the court to hold that in an appro-
priate case the NLRB has the authority, under the express and implied
powers granted to it in the NLRA, to consolidate existing bargaining
units without the consent of the employer. If a bargaining unit may be
organized and certified by the Board without employer consent, it
follows that it may also be enlarged or merged with another unit even
though the employer does not assent." Nevertheless, one disadvantage
of consolidation was put forward by Members Fanning and Jenkins
in PPG Industries, Inc.,' a case in which the Board refused to grant
a merger of units pursuant to a unit clarification petition. They con-
tended that the merger of bargaining units would tend to disrupt the
stable collective bargaining relationship between the company and the
union because it would add several more union committeemen to the
wage committee of the merged unit, and each committeeman had a veto
power over the final collective bargaining settlement, thus making it
more difficult to obtain a negotiated agreement." While it must be
admitted that the disadvantage posited by Members Fanning and
Jenkins is one which may prompt refusal to exercise the power to
consolidate in a specific case, it does not invalidate the policy argument
advocating recognition of statutory authority to compel merger in an
appropriate case. Moreover, even assuming that this argument possesses
some validity, it is submitted that it is greatly outweighed by several
factors which those members did not note.
These factors demonstrate the desirability of allowing consolida-
tion of bargaining units in an appropriate case. First, when either an
employer or a union has the power to prohibit a merger of units by
continually refusing to assent, there is a great potential for a prolonged
bargaining dispute over this issue." Second, a single multiplant unit
compels the parties to a bargaining agreement to deal with each other
co 29
	 § 158(a) (5) (1970).
in In most instances, the effect of consolidation would be to provide the union with
greater leverage in bargaining since the union would be able to dose more plants and
production areas during a strike. On the other hand, it is quite possible for an employer
to desire a consolidation of bargaining units when such consolidation would be to his
advantage. For example, if a union has organized several units, but it is less strong in
some units than in others, or has lost strength in some units, the employer could seek a
consolidation of units in hopes that, in a subsequent decertification election, the weakness
of the union in some units would prevent it from receiving a majority vote in the single
consolidated bargaining unit.
58 180 N.L.R.B. 477, 73 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1969).
59 Id. at 478-79, 73 L.R.R.M. at 1002-03.
60
 A cogent example is presented by the instant case. Before the dispute reached the
Third Circuit, it had lasted for twelve years and had been the subject of six other Board
or court decisions.
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on a centralized basis instead of on an individual plant level, and thus
allows centralized management and administration; it also precludes
uneven treatment among the units by the employer in order to create
employee dissatisfaction with the union and weaken its bargaining
position.° Third, consolidation into units of the broadest possible scope
facilitates the administration of the NLRA by the Board, in that the
lack of fragmentation enhances the stability of the collective bargaining
relationship." In order to encourage this stability, the Board's initial
unit determinations often favor larger units—assuming, of course, that
there is a community of interest among the plants.' For example, the
NLRB has stated that, although it often finds that employees at several
plants of an employer could separately constitute appropriate units, it
looks with favor upon a consolidation of such units into a single bar-
gaining group in cases where employees have chosen the same bargain-
ing representative and where the single group could constitute an
appropriate unit." In sum, the need to encourage stable bargaining
relationships necessitates the conclusion that the merger of bargaining
units should be allowed as a matter of policy under the NLRA when
a sufficient community of interest has been shown. While it is arguable
that merger may be a proper matter for Board deferral to collective
bargaining, the factors listed above demonstrate the need for Board
power—even though that power be usually allowed to lie dormant—to
compel merger when the facts of a particular case dictate such a course.
Assuming the existence of a statutory basis of Board authority
to merge existing bargaining units through a unit clarification, and
that in a given case such a merger is desirable, the next question is
whether there are any preferable alternatives to use of the unit clarifi-
cation procedure. Two potential alternatives are fairly obvious. The
union could strike; however, it is unlikely that the refusal of the em-
ployer to consent to a merger would be a sufficiently crucial issue to
cause a union to commit its resources to a strike." Moreover, a strike
is not an alternative that should be encouraged under the NLRA, since
one of the principal purposes of the Act is to promote industrial peace."
A second possible alternative is a petition to the NLRB for a 9(c)
representation election, in conjunction with which the Board could find
a single, consolidated unit to be appropriate for collective bargaining.
However, it is highly questionable whether it is desirable, as a matter
of public policy, to force a union that has been certified or voluntarily
recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative in each of the
units to subject itself to attacks on its majority status by the employer
81
 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 164 (1941).
82 Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable Labor
Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 479, 503 (1967).
62 Id.
64 W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 814, 819, 13 L.R.R.M. 132, 133 (1943).
65
 In the instant case, the requested merger of bargaining units was vehemently
resisted in collective bargaining, yet the union never allowed this issue to cause a strike.
66
 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See also 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
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or by other unions during a representation election:" Further, a poten-
tial legal obstacle to the union's seeking a representation election was
pointed out by the majority in the original 1968 Libbey-Owens-Ford
case: "It is certainly not the best route either, where, as in this case,
there is no actual question concerning representation because the
Employer does not dispute the Union's representative status in any of
the plants!'" In order to obtain a representation election, there must
exist a question of representation under 9(c). Yet, as the Board pointed
out, there can not be a question of representation where the union en-
joys recognition by the employer. Since a usual condition for consolida-
tion of bargaining units is that the union already represents all of the
units sought to be consolidated, it would seem to be impossible to use a
representation election for this purpose.
Neither a strike nor a representation election, therefore, seems to
be a desirable alternative to the unit clarification for consolidating
bargaining units. There is, however, a potential third alternative, which
was first introduced by the Board in a series of cases involving Chrysler
Corporation" but which has not been used in recent years. In the
Chrysler cases, the Board merged several existing bargaining units over
employer opposition. Since the cases were decided before the Unit
Clarification Rule was promulgated, it is possible to interpret them
either as an alternative method by which the Board may compel merger
or as a precedent for the first Libbey-Owens-Ford decision.
In the original 1939 Chrysler decision, in conjunction with a 9(c)
representation election in which two factions of the UAW, one affiliated
with the CIO and the other with the AFL, claimed to represent the
employees, the NLRB found that the production and maintenance
workers at various Chrysler plants constituted thirteen appropriate
units." The CIO affiliate was victorious in eleven elections, the AFL
affiliate won one; •neither received a majority in the remaining election."
On motion of the CIO-UAW, the Board issued its second decision and
altered its initial unit determination by consolidating into a single unit
07
 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1970) establishes a procedure by which employees in a bar-
gaining unit can obtain a decertification election by filing a petition showing that thirty
percent of the employees no longer desire that the union representing them continue to
be their exclusive representative. As to the timing of representation elections, see 29
U.S.C. 159(c) (3) (1970) (bar on elections held within twelve months after valid elec-
tion); see also discussion of contract-bar doctrine in Labor Law Group Trust, Labor
Relations and the Law 384-88 (3d ed. 1965).
69
 169 N.L.R.B. at 127, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1098. But cf. the subterfuge suggested in
Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 145 N.L.R.B. 1521, 55 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1964);
see also Goslee, Clarification of Bargaining Units and Amendments to Certifications, 1968
Wis L. Rev. 988, 990-91.
69
 Chrysler Corp., 13 N.L.R.B. 1303, 4 L.R.R.M. 398 (1939); Chrysler Corp., 17
N.L.R.B. 737, 5 L.R.R.M. 338 (1939); Chrysler Corp., 42 N.L.R.B. 1145, 10 L.R.R.M.
221 (1942).
7° 13 N.L.R.B. 1303, 4 L.R.R.M. 398 (1939). Twelve units were single plants. One
unit included two plants. Id. One of the twelve single plants also included a fourteenth
unit, discussion of which is omitted, as it is of no analytical value to this note.
71 17 N.L.R.B. at 738-41, 746-47, 5 L.R.R.M. at 338-39.
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the eleven units represented by the CIO-UAW." In 1942, after the
CIO-UAW had also become the exclusive bargaining agent for the two
single-plant units which had denied the CIO-UAW such status in the
1939 elections, the Board issued a third decision which merged the
multiplant unit and the two single-plant units." It is true that during
this series of decisions the Board never used the term unit clarification;
nevertheless, it did consolidate the bargaining units, over the objections
of the employer, by a redetermination of the appropriate unit." The
Chrysler cases were followed in 1945 by another case, Western Union
Tel. Co., in which the NLRB consolidated existing bargaining units."
In each of these cases, the Board in effect found that the extent of
union organization necessitated recognition of the larger unit. However,
during this period the Board did not feel that in every case the only
appropriate unit should be the largest possible based on extent of
organization, but thought that another unit, in a given case, could also
be presumptively appropriate." Thus it is submitted that these cases
are analogous to and precedent for Glass Workers in that both the
merged and separate units were presumptively appropriate." It is sub-
mitted, then, that the procedure used in the Chrysler cases was essen-
tially the same as a unit clarification, lacking only the name," and that
the unit clarification procedure codifies and supersedes this past practice
of the Board. The Board in its 1968 Libbey-Owens-Ford decision did
not in fact effect a radical extension of its authority under section 9 (b),
72
 17 N.L.R.B. 737, 5 L.R.R.M. 338 (1939). The single unit included twelve plants.
78
 42 N.L.R.B. 1145, 10 L.R.R.M. 221 (1942).
T4
 These earlier cases are distinguishable from Glass Workers in that they do not
involve Board-ordered elections to determine employee sentiment towards merger. In this
regard, they are more extreme than the Glass Workers decision since employee sentiment
may have been against consolidation. The election ordered in the first Libbey-Owens-Ford
decision has been characterized as "the only practical means to aid the Board" in deter-
mination of the propriety of merger in the affected units. Comment, 1968-1969 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 785, 801 (1969). It would
be incongruous to deny this aid to the Board while allowing the Board to redesignate
appropriate units; merger could be effectuated on a union petition despite employee and
employer opposition, and the Board would thus be forced to search in the dark. But see
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 130, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096, 1099 (1968)
(opinion of Members Fanning and Jenkins).
75 61 N.L.R.B. 110 (1945). See also W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 814, 13
L.R.R.M. 132 (1943) (recognition of de facto merger of units based upon bargaining
history).
76 W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 814, 819, 13 L.R.R.M. 132, 133 (1943).
77 An attempt has been made to distinguish the third Chrysler case from the factual
situation in Glass Workers in Abodeely, The NLRB and the Unit Clarification Petition,
117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1075, 1092-93 (1969). However, it is felt that the factual distinctions
that do exist are not significant.
78 Alternatively, the Chrysler cases could be viewed as providing an existing in-
dependent means for the Board to merge units, since the method used in the Chrysler
cases has never been specifically disapproved. Such an interpretation would have provided
a subterfuge by which a court holding that prevented use of the unit clarification pro-
ceeding to compel merger could have been evaded. This subterfuge would consist of
characterization of the merger as occurring under 9(c). Cf. Pac. Coast Shipbuilders Assn,
157 N.L.R.B. 384, 61 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1966); Goslee, supra note 68, at 990-91.
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but merely revalidated a position on merger which it had never
abandoned.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Glass Workers upholds the author-
ity of the Board to merge bargaining units over employer objection by
use of the unit clarification procedure, yet it does not require Board
use of the procedure. The position of the Board on whether to use this
authority has shifted in cases subsequent to its decision in the first
Libbey -Owens-Ford case in 1968. In PPG Industries, Inc.," and Rohm
& Haas Co.," the Board dismissed petitions for unit clarifications to
merge existing bargaining units. In PPG Industries, Members Fanning
and Jenkins found a lack of statutory authority to consolidate bargain-
ing units in a unit clarification proceeding, while Chairman McCulloch
and Member Brown voted to conduct self-determination elections. The
case turned upon the opinion of Member Zagoria, who concurred in
the result reached by Members Fanning and Jenkins. Zagoria, a mem-
ber of the original Libbey-Owens-Ford majority, adhered to his belief
that the Board has the authority to use the unit clarification procedure
to consolidate existing units, but found that a consolidated, multiplant
unit would not be appropriate in the situation presented. He distin-
guished the original Libbey-Owens -Ford case on the basis that the
proposed multiplant unit in PPG Industries was not an employer-wide
unit, and thus lacked administrative coherence.' In Rohm & Haas,
decided by a three-member panel, Members Fanning and Jenkins ad-
hered to their position, first propounded in their dissent to the initial
Libbey -Owens-Ford case, that the Board did not have the requisite
statutory authority to order consolidation in a unit clarification pro-
ceeding and denied the petition."
Subsequent to PPG Industries and Rohm & Haas, the final
Libbey -Owens -Ford decision issued." The vote in this decision, as in
PPG Industries, was 2-1-2. The concurring member, however, was
Chairman Miller, one of the new members; his basis of concurrence
was different from that of former Member Zagoria in PPG Industries.
Chairman Miller believed that, while the Board possessed the statutory
power to compel merger, consolidation was a proper subject for Board
deferral to collective bargaining."
Thus, although a majority of the NLRB has not reversed its first
Libbey-Owens-Ford decision, which held that the Board has statutory
79 180 N.L.R.B. 477, 73 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1969).
80 183 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1970).
81 180 N.L.R.B. at 481, 73 L.R.R.M. at 1005 (concurring opinion).
82 183 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1258. Member McCulloch concurred; he
found the original Libbey-Owens-Ford decision factually distinguishable. Id.
88 This case was heard by Chairman Miller and members Brown, Kennedy, Fanning
and Jenkins. Member Zagoria's term expired Dec. 16, 1969, and he was replaced by
Miller on June 3, 1970. Miller assumed the position of Chairman and did not participate
in the June 9, 1970, Rohn & Haas decision. Subsequently, Member McCulloch was re-
placed by Member Kennedy. Since the final Libbey-Owens-Ford decision, Member
Penello has taken the seat of Gerald Brown.
84 189 N.L.R.B. No, 139, 76 L.R.R.M. at 1807.
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authority to use the unit clarification procedure to merge bargaining
units, and although the Third Circuit has specifically upheld this au-
thority in Glass Workers, the Board has avoided using it. It remains
an open, and interesting, question whether the Board will exercise its
statutory authority to merge bargaining units when an appropriate case
is presented to it, or whether its 1968 Libbey-Owens-Ford decision will
become an isolated aberration.
The answer to this question may lie in the composition of the
Board." At present, none of the three members of the majority in the
original Libbey-Owens-Ford case remains on the Board. Of their re-
placements, Member Kennedy agreed with their position that the
Board possesses and should exercise the authority to consolidate bar-
gaining units in an appropriate unit clarification proceeding;" it can
be assumed that he will adhere to this position. A second new member,
Chairman Miller, contended in his concurring opinion in the final
Libbey-Owens-Ford case that consolidation of units should be a matter
left to collective bargaining. Presumably, he also will not change his
position.87 Member Penello has not yet expressed an opinion on the
consolidation of units in a unit clarification. Members Fanning and
Jenkins, who dissented in the original Libbey-Owens-Ford case, are
still on the Board. As they demonstrated in the final Libbey-Owens-
Ford case, they had not, as of that time, changed their position that
the Board does not have the authority to merge bargaining units in a
unit clarification proceeding. It will be interesting to note whether, in
light of the Third Circuit's Glass Workers decision, these two members
will choose to exercise this court-sanctioned authority in an appropriate
case." Their views, along with that of Member Penello, will be decisive
in determining the future position of the Board on merger of existing
units through unit clarification.
MICHAEL D. MALFITANO
Administrative Law—Federal Trade Commission—Lack of Author-
ity to Promulgate Trade Regulation Rules Having the Effect of Law
—National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion.'—Plaintiff, a representative of the petroleum industry, brought this
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
85 See note 83 supra.
86 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806, 1808 (1971)
(dissenting opinion).
87 In Denver, Salt Lake & Pacific Stages, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 81 L.R.R.M.
1085 (1972), decided after Glass Workers, Chairman Miller specifically reiterated his
position. Id. at —, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1086 (concurring opinion).
88 In the sole merger case since the Glass Workers decision, Member Jenkins con-
curred in dismissing the petition. The combined unit was not shown appropriate. Id. at
—, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1085 & n.4. Member Fanning was not on the panel.
1 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972).
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